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THE FROBEEM OF OPTIMIZATION THBOUGH INNOVATION
S. W, Steinkamp*
A core assumption of most theoretical models In the social sciences Is that
of a "rational nan", A rational man Is one who, given a set of abilities and a
situation, proceeds to optimize over an existence horizon by taking iuivantage of
all possibilities to Increase expected utility through changes in behavior. By
making different assumptions about abilities, situations, types of permlssable
changes, the time span, and operational surrogates for utility, rational nan
turns out in the literature to be many different men, each representli»g an abstzactlon.
Some abstractions facilitate analysis of the real manj others leave out properties
and processes t^lch are central to real man's quest for the best. As a result,
theories based on these latter abstractions lead to absurd conclusions about
positive and normative b^lavlo1^^f the real man. One set of processes assumed
away are those relating to discovery and innovation. Real man clearly employs
these processes in his quest for the best, yet most rigorous formulations in
microeconomics, welfare theory, management science, and organizational analysis
Ignore these relevant processes by assvunlng perfection or non-existence.
The obvious question to ask, though seldom discussed, is why the assumption of
no discovery and innovation is Invariably present in rigorous formulations. The
answer, It will be maintained, is to be found In the "Veltanslcht" underlying the
traditional approach to optimization. This approach, to be called the "received
view of optimization", is based on a judgment that the past is connected to the
future throti^ an explicit, potential knowable chain of causal events. If, then,
sufficient knowledge of the past is acquired, the future can be projected out of
the past in an unbroken chain of events. Analysis of optimization problems must
Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Illinois, Urbana. The
author is grateful to his colleague Takashi Takayama for many helpful suggestions
in developing this paper.
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proceed in terms of trajectories implied by these chains.
It trill be shown that optimization based on this view necessarily loads to
specification of suboptiinal trajectories, given, certain commonly accepted pro-
perties of processes leading to innovation. It Is further shown that a different
method based on a broader but encompassing "Weltansicht" which includes processes
associated with creativity must be employed. This broader view must become
respectable if social scientists are to devote more effort to the stuly of op-
timization involving discovery and innovation.
The research strategy of those studying optimization has been to identify
analytically manageable situations or problem sets by employing decomposition
and abstraction. As a result, the mathematician may have one definition of
optimization, the economist another, and the operations researcher yet another.
The resulting conceptual structure takes on a hierarchical character as real
conditions and necessary processes are carved away by use of assumptions.
At the base of this hierarchy is the total situation as it relates to, say,
an individual. For example, a socially relevant optimization problem exists in
relation to a new-bom baby. What is the optimal course of action for it over its
existence horizon? At this level the optimization problem must involve identifying
optimal processes for acquiring goals and objectives as well as processes for
learning about an evolving world and for generating innovations to change this world,
The establishment of a new firm Involves a similar thou^ not so expansive set of
problems since certain necessary processes for learning and innovating can be hired
in the form of individvials and services supplied by other businesses.
At a hi^er level of the hierarchy, partial problems can be identified in
which the individual has specific objectives, knowledge, abilities relating to
learning and innovating, and a specific situation. In another space of the hier>-
archy the time horizon may be reduced to the short run where innovation and real
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capital changes are not possible. The process of innovation, necessary for opti-
mization over longer periods, is no longer relevant.
Elsewhere In the structure the traditional microeconomic assumptions of
perfect knowledge, instantaneous and perfect mobility, and a transient state of
equilibrium with no Innovation have been employed. If perfect knowledge of an
individual is defined as an isomorphism between a model and the real world, the
optimization problem becomes one of finding an optimum in the model. If the
model is a mathematical system, then optimization involves a set of techniques
for identifying the conditions for optimization of the objective function.
I. A NEW OPTIMIZATION SPACE
It is necessary to identify a new space within this conceptual hierarchy, a
space in which a behavioral unit can optimize through learning, innovating, and
meta-model-optimization-theorizing in a competitive system. As a first approxi-
mation let learning be defined as a process which begins with existing real systems
and generates models of these systems through discovery (experimentation and
communication). In contrast, innovating is defined as the generation (creation and
copy) of new and novel models iri^ich are then employed as a pattern for the pro-
duction of new and novel real systems. Keta-model-optimization-theorizing is
defined as the generation of new techniques for identifying optimum in new and
novel classes of models. An example of the latter in the area of mathematical
models is the recent development of the matheiratical theory of optimal control
processes.
Obviously, this paper will not deal with the general problem of optimization
in this space. Rather it focuses on an aspect of the problem central to all
higher order optimization problems in this space, that of the conceptual or
methodological approach necessary for a behavioral unit to identify optimal
trajectories. As a result, most of the broader problem is carved away by
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simplifyllog assumptions which hopefully can be removed in future work. Assumptions
will be denoted by a circled number.
The behavioral unit on which the analysis is focused can be thought of as
an individual, an organization such as a firm, or a societal governing unit.
However, the present analysis will treat the behavioral unit as an entrepreneur
who is planning to establish and operate a firm over some finite period of time
—
his existence horizon. This frame is selected because it is pedogodically con-
venient to refer to processes and systems making up the firm. However, problems
of organization, coordination, and cooperation of subunits are assumed away (T)
,
The entrepreneur is assumed to exist in the technically most advanced country
in the world (2) • IT^e entrepreneur is treated as operating independently of
other entrepreneurs in the system (3). He conducts all research and development
necessary to innovate (4) • Tnis assumption is relaxed later in the paper allowing
the entrepreneur to copy and employ ideas and models arising from university, govern-
ment, and spin-off ideas from other entrepreneurs. The entrepreneur can borrow
and lend any amount of resources at interest rate i (5). Finally, the firm must
innovate in order to optL-aize over its existence horizon (6). Assumptions three
and six arise from the broader objectives relating to analysis of this space.
Assumption three reflects the fact that it is simpler to model the firm in
independence than in a competitive situation where interdependence and conjectural
variations must be taken into account. However, in gaining simplicity by
assuming independence, the necessity of innovating by firms in a modem, dynamic, •
competitive market is lost. Assumption six re-introduces this necessity, thus
allowing the development of a model which may subsequently form a foundation
for the analysis of competitive situations.
No Innovation Possible . Let us momentarily employ the traditional assumption
that future innovation is not possible. The objective or goal of the entrepreneur

is to optimize utility over his existence horizon. Operationally it is necessary
for him to map his utility into spaces defined on the real system. For con-
venience, let a vector defined on this sijace be called profits. Let profits "be
employed as the objective criterion. Further, let that part of his environment
which produces profits be called the object system. The object system then
can be thought of as a dynamic market and production situation. The object system
has associated with it a time dimension which is treated as a set of discrete
stages. 'Rie existence horizon of the entrepreneur is defined as T stages in
length. Notation with a tilda refers to true conditions in the real system. The
absence of a tilda denotes a corresponding symbol in a model. In any stage the
object system has a state s. defined on a vector of phase coordinates or at a
higgler level of resolution on a vector of dimensions and structures of the real
system. An entrepreneur seeking to control the object system can initiate an
action a. defined on a vector of dimensions and structures. Finally, a dis-
turbance d. may occur in any stage. The state of the object system in t+1 will
be treated as depending on its state in t, the action initiated in t, and the
disturbance in t. Let the real object system be represented by:
(1) %^^^mtt^d^) t= -- T
or in an opportunity sense as:
(2) S^i=®(St A^ 3^) t=0,l T
Let S^ , A^, and D^ refer to the set of all possible states, alternatives, and
disturbance vectors which may occur from some beginning to stage T. Let the
fixed state of the arts and sciences implied by (2) be denoted by Q,
Assuming a unique sequence of actions for an entreiireneur in this object
system, the achievement of such an optimum depends on whether sf and a* forming
t t
1 The term "object system" is employed Instead of "controlled system" because
with innovation present the former usually has different batsic properties than
the latter.
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part of the optimal trajectory are represented in the entrepreneur's model of
(2) and whether the transition functions are correctly specified and estimated.
It follows then that the problem of optimization cannot be divorced from the
learning-discovery process which generates the entrepreneur's model of (2).
Since this paper deals with innovation rather than learning, and since the
learning problem has traditionally been handled, as Shubik JJ3Q] points out,
by an assumption of perfect knowledge or complete information, we shall take a
similar route to simplification and assume perfect historical knowledge (t)*
Perfect historical knowledge (FHK) at t is defined as a model (mental,
iconic, topological, mathematical) vrtiose behavior, program, and structure p.2J
is isomorjiiic to the historical object system,
(3) Cst+r«(st \ \)] =Cst-Hi=«(St \ \}1 t= - 00. ... .0
where the left side is the model and the right side is the real system. This
formulation allows for perfect knowledge of innovations which have occurred in
the past. Since in a dynamic system PHK exists at any present t, t=l T,
this implies a perfect learning process operating over T,
But even with FHK, the entrepreneur may not achieve the optimum in the real
object system because he cannot identify an optimum in the model. This problem
is eliminated by assuming perfect model optimizing techniques (PMCT) (s).
Given an appropriate objective function, the entrepreneur can now Identify
the conditions for optimization in the object system over T. Let us now consider
the introduction of another system or process which generates the conditions for
Innovating with respect to this object system.
Innovation Possible . Innovation is defined as a restructuring of an object
system by an entrepreneur in accord with new and novel ideas or models. A model
is new if it has not been used previously. A model is novel if it could not have
been -employed at an earlier stage because it was not logically derivable from the

-7-
set of models knovm by h"m at that stage. An innovation of the type described is
BJi "i-innovation" for it represents an innovation for the individual but not
necessarily innovation for a larger reference group.
The process associated with innovating can be dealt with in terms of two
parts, ..The first is a subprocess or system for generating a new, novel, experi-
mentally verified model. The second is the traditional investment process which
can be viewed as part of the object system. The decision to invest involves
selecting from a set of existing alternative models of production processes and
products those which offer the hi^est expected return over some period when
depreciation and obsolescence are taken into account. The models making up the
set include a model of the existing production process and products, other known
models, and the innovation model. If the innovation model yields the hi^est
expected return, then it becomes the "blue-print" for investment and subsequent
production until the next innovation model appears ; if it does not yield the
highest return, innovation does not occur.
Let the period necessary for the generation of an innovation model be
denoted by h and be defined as r. stager, long. Since the entrepreneur can
repeatedly i^ovate, the actual number of such innovations will be denoted
2— 'z; .To simplifyH where H^ L f^h it is further assumed that the state of the
arts and sciences in the object system does not change diaring an innovation model
generation period. The real object system can then be denoted by:
(^) \{^\r\fi^t\^\t^ h=0.1 H t=l r^
In a system where innovation is occurring, it follows that S^ c S. .
,h . h+1
.
^h. ^fh+1^ ' ^"^^ ^ ^ ®(h+l).' ^f^ other owrds the state of the arts and sciences
is expanding. Figure one depicts the relation between the real object system
and the models known to the entrepreneur. It is assumed in describing figure
one that an innovation model generating system (IMGS) already exists. Since h=0
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is reserved for the decision on setting up an IMGS, the analysis begins with
h-1, t-1.
Figure 1
Period h=l
The circles in the top row of figure one represent the state of the arts
and sciences as represented by (4) for h=l, t=l. However, to simplify notation,
Oj^j will be so employed. Given PHK, the entrepreneur has an isomorphic model
which will be represented by ©. ^ and a circle of the same diameter as 6 . As
Indicated 611=612"
"^r ^l •
During period one the IMGS of the entrepreneur is generating ne\; concepts
and submodels of new products and processes. In a sense, then, his state of the
arts and sciences runs ahead of that in the real system as indicated by the in-
creasing size of the circles for ©12, ©^o ©1 . In h=l, t^r., the
entrepreneur then has a new and novel model of a product and process. He can
1 The independence of the two systems during the r. stage arises from the
assumption of R-:K. The normal iterative developmen\ of the innovation model is
unnecessary.
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then compare the expected return from employing this model as a base for in-
vestment and production during period two with that from not innovating.
Assuming the innovation model has greater expected return, the entrepreneur proceeds
in h-2, t=l to embody the model in the real object system, thus altering the state
of the arts and sciences in the real system.
In period two the process repeats itself. In evaluating the new innovation
model available in h=2, t=r2, it is compared with the innovation model generated
during the first period as embodied in the object system. The process continues
to the entrepreneur's existence horizon and involves H innovations.
The reader may be bothered by the existence of PHK and yet the possibility
that new dimensions, structures, and relations in the real system may be
created. An extreme case may depict the distinction between learning and inno-
vating. If by a supreme stroke one could give a cave man perfect knowledge of his
existing world he would Icnow that iron and rubber existed and how these related
to each other, but he would not with this knowledge be able to produce a car or
a plow. To do so he must create or synthesize from the multitude of possible
combinations of the existing properties, dimensions, relations, and structures,
that specific combination which when brought together in ways not naturally
existing would enable him to produce a car or a plow. The set of systems
created or synthesized by man to achieve specific objectives has been referred to
by Herbert Simon as artificial systems |j3lj . Clearly man has not reached the
limits of the set of systems which could be generated. There must exist in a
limiting sense a total set or artificial systems which may be created or syn-
thesized. Let us simply denote this set by <3^ which in turn implies a set of
states S.. and alternatives A,.. The process for creating can be viewed as one
of searching this enormous space for models of new products and processes which
represent something better than what the entrepreneur currently knows.
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An entrepreneur seeks to control his IKGS and object system so as to
optimize his utility. Let us simply assume the following models are known
perfectly over T. A model relating profits to the state of the object system
j
(5) Kt-'^(\t^ ^=1 \ ^-' ^h
A model mappin^r utility into net profits // (profits minus cost of operating the IMGS)i
(6) U^^=U(^^^) h=l H t=l r^
To simplify, let utility be linear monotonic function of all net profits or gains
in the remainder of the paper.
An objective function is defined:
where I>=l/l+i or D=l depending on preferences, i=discount rate and T' is the number
of stages to t^^.
Optimization of (?) requires that present actions be related to future states.
The ability of the entrepreneur to make such predictions when he is innovating
hinges on predicting the process that generates innovation models. Given assumption
four, Innovation models must be created. The prediction problem then resolves
itself to prediction of models generated by the creative process.
Brunsr \_5J associates creativity with surprise. A new model surprises the
reference group. The term surprise is not used in the sense of "startle", as when
a door slams, but in the sense of seeing a set of new and important relations in
an objective system for the first time. For the reference group, surprise implies
that the new model would not have been predicted from what was known earlier.
Shackle equates creativity with intuition. The following quote summarizes
his view: "Men imagine outcomes which come into their minds we know not whence;
these outcomes can be new in the most absolute and radical sense, untraceable to
the individual's past or present, sprung from nowhere."
J29, plOJ.
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This almost mystical, Bergsonian view leaves no question about the unpredict-
ability of the creative (intuitive) process.
Even Newell, Shavf, and Simon [23] "ho view creativity as a complex form of
problem-solving which can ultimately be reducible to a set of heuristics, claim
only that the heuristics will make this form of problem-solving more efficient;
they do not claim that the outcome is predictable. Let us then formalize this as
the sanctity of creation postulate; models which will be created in the future
cannot be predicted by their creator at an earlier point (^.
It does not, however, follow from this postulate that aspects of the innovation
model cannot be predicted until it emerges in completed form. Rather, the picture
which emerges from empirical studies of the processes leading to Innovation is
one of an initial insist or discovery followed by an evolutionary stream of
small creative contributions which yield or culminate in an innovation [9,l4,15,l6j
.
Numerous attempts have been made to construct taxonomies of the phases through which
the process moves. From this work emerges a picture of what the potential
innovator Tnay predict of the future innovations. Three phases common to all
these taxonomies can be identified:
1) An open-ended phase which exists prior to the initial insight into basic
plausibility or feasibility of an innovation. In this jiiase the entrepreneur has
no knowledge of the specific states and actions which may be generated in the
future. In terms of figure one, this phase exists for period h+2. For example,
the entrepreneur has no Idea in period h=l of the product or process he may innovate
into the object system in periods h=3f 4...,H. The long run for an entrepreneur
is defined with respect to period h as h+k, k=2,3 (H-h).
2) A phase, beginning with the initial insight, during which the innovation
model is being generated. The period terminates when a model sufficient to support
an actual innovation exists. Studies of research and development ]]l2,20,28] reveal
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that rany of the evolving properties of the product and process were predicted
months and years before their realization in operational systems. But in some
instances major components were not predicted. Jantsch [llj similarly reports
examples of successful and unsuccessful prediction. Unfortunately the relative
incidence of successes and failures must not be taken too seriously because of
recall bias in favor of successes. Clearly during this period it is not possible
to generalize on what can and cannot be predicted. However, it is known that
those aspects of the final innovation model not yet created cannot be predicted.
This phase exists for an entrepreneur in period h, with respect to period
h+1. Let the innovation intermediate run be defined as period h+1 with respect
to period h.
3) A phase during which the actual innovation is being carried out. Ob-
viously the borderline between this and the previous period is not clear cut,
because the innovation model is beinpr implemented and refined as inconsistencies
and inadequacies appear in its actual application. Although, under the assumption
of perfect. historical knowledge, prediction would be error-free in this phase.
In reality there is substantial uncertainty about the impact of new products
and processes on markets ^ij , Since innovation is treated in this paper as a
form of real investment and production which is based on a new and novel model,
this phase is always the current period. It is defined as the innovating short
1
run.
What then are the implications of this view of the innovating process for
the optimization problem?
1 The innovating short run includes the traditional short run plus the period
necessary for changes in the capital structure of the firm. The latter will be
called the capital intermediate run.
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II. THE MATHclMATIGAL THEORY OF OPTIMIZATION
Let the analysis be limited to the class of real systems which can be
theoretically described (in a limiting sense) by mathematical systems for which
the mathematical theory of optimal control processes as developed by Bellman \2j
and Pontryagin et al J25J ^-re applicable. Since most optimizations in economics,
sociolo^, operations research, and systems analysis are based on special cases of
this mathematical theory, the conclusions drawn in this paper relate to all
these areas.
A review of the assumptions underlying this theory reveals that the set of
states S and the set of actions A (control parameters) which may occur over T
be closed, and that each state and action in these sets be specifiable. It should
be noted that when the mathematical theory is applied to stochastic models, the
assumption implies piredlction of the possible existence of elements in 3 and A, not
their actual occurrance or use at ht, A second assumption underlying the theory
is that the state transitions 6, are defined for all elements in the product set
S X A. Since these transition functions are defined on S and A, attention will
be focused on the closure and specification requirements on S and A.
It is important to note that our criticism of the received view does not
extend to the underlying mathematical theory. In fact, the mathematical theory is
employed as an integral part of the broader formulation of the optimization
problem presented later in the paper.
III. THE HEGSIVED VIEW OF OPTIMIZATION
This approach to applying the mathematical theory to optimization of real
systems focuses on tracing out the time paths or decision tree associated with
specific sequences of actions of the entrepreneur. The approach focuses on the
specific products, production processes, and market characteristics through which
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the entrepreneur achieves Its objectives. For example, Debrue, in his "Theory
of Value" has consumers and producers optimizing in terms of consumption sets
based on the concept of a commodity " defined by a specification of all its
I*iysical characteristics, of its availability date, and of its availability
location" \7, p.lOJand in terms of production sets similarly defined on specific
real events and spaces. This frame of reference is present in traditional
economic theory as interpreted by Brems [4j and Murphy's [2lj more recent attempts
to introduce adaptive processes into economic theory.
Consider first the application of the received view approach to identifying
an optimal seouence of actions at h^l, t=l in the system described in figure one.
It vra.s shown earlier that entrepreneurs could not predict the states and actions
they mi^t innovate into the real system two periods ahead. Thus the states and
actions with subscripts h«=3 H cannot be included in his model at h=l t^l.
But by assumption six, the optimal trajectory includes states and actions that
will be created in the future. It follows that the received view approach must
identify suboptimal conditions. The use of stochastic models does not resolve
the problem because the relevant elements in S,. and A., on which to define
distributions are unknown. Thus a condition exists which is beyond those tradi-
tionally associated with uncertainty.
If as in the traditional case presented earlier, It is assumed that the
entrepreneur has PHK, B'CT and no innovation may occur, then the conditions for
use of the received view are met. But note the difference in the handling of the •
learning and innovating processes. The PHK assumption recognizes the necessity of
learning processes and brings them into optimization problems in the limiting sense
of a perfect process. Ttie assumption of no innovation excludes innovation pjpocesses
from the optimization problem.
Clearly this critique of the received view is unfair. For the entrepreneur
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is not in reality restricted to a single decision at h=l, t=l, but rather can
reoptimize in each stage as the future becomes the present and new elements in
S.. and A,, are created and the distributions on S, . and A, . are sharpened with
feedback of information and perfect historical learning. Within this broader
framework, two new dimensions of the problem must be considered—the predictability
of the relevant dimensions and structures as they evolve in the IMGS and the
irrelevance of the distant future for present optimization.
Given the evolving innovation model in period h, it can be argued that the
important possible dimension and structural elements of the state and action vectors
can be predicted sufficiently in advance so that current action can be taken to
assure that those i*lch form part of the optimal trajectory will be generated and
available at the required stage in the future. Other unknown properties and oper-
ating characteristics are not relevant and as they become relevant they are
learned or generated by the IMG system. Given the present state of our knowledge
of innovation generating processes, the validity of these arguments is not obvious
even for the innovation intermediate run.
It is obvious that one necessary current action is to continue the operation
of the IKG system. Fur without it, the missing elenents and sub-systems necessary
for a complete ir.r:o\aticn model v;ill not be created and the optimal trajectory
cannot be achieved. Thus even if one accepts the earlier argument for prediction
of Important properties of the evolving product and process, there remains a
necessary decision on optimisation of the IMG system. On the one hand, the essence
of the IMG system is to create submodels and processes which by the sanctity of
creation postulate cannot be predicted and thus ultimately related to the objective
criteria-net profits. But on the other hand, the missing elements are imbedded in a
broader product or process system in which functional analysis frequently allows
limits to be placed on the possible value of different created solutions. But the
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tightness of these limits depends in turn on the validity and precision of the
predictions from the evolving innovation model with respect to the innovation
intermediate run. It is felt that this intermediate run problem quickly boggs
down in a circular mass of ignorance about what can and cannot be pr«jdicted of
evolving innovation models and about which predictions are necessary for op-
timizing the operation of the IMG systems. Let us then search for a cleaner
problem which contains elements of this more complex problem.
Underlying the analysis thus far has been the assumption that an IMG system
exists. However, if we assume it does not exist, then by assumption six, long
run optimization by the entrepreneur requires that one be set up. Let this
decision be made in t-M). In the absence of an IMGS the entrepreneur can only
predict states, actions, and transitions for period 1, He then has no ideas of
what innovations can be generated in even h*2. He knows nothing of the innovation
models which he may create and thus can make no predictions of the specific
products, processes, etc, which he may embody in the object system and of the
resulting effect on profits for h=2,3....H. Here then is an optimization problem
which relates purely to that part of the intermediate run problem where nothing
can be known of the specific states and alternative components yet to be created.
It is felt that a solution to this simpler long run problem may form a key to
modeling the innovation intermediate run and solving its optimization problem.
Microeconomic literature is noticeably silent on the long run problem, aside
from the long run ane.lysis under the assumption of no innovation or technological
change. Lord Keynes' response was to focus on the short run, for in the long
run we are all dead. Cyert and March give a similar, though not so extreme,
response, " so long as the environment of the firm is unstable (and predict-ably
unstable) the heart of the theory must be the process of short run adaptive
reactions." {f>, p lOo]
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IV. THE DECISION ON ESTABLISHING AN IHGS
Given that the entrepreneur cannot predict the products and Drocesses
created in h=2 H, it follows that he cannot trace the consequences of
selecting different IKG systems through an unbroken sequence of state or state
distributions to a flow of profits from the changing object system. Under these
conditions, decisions on T*ich IMG system to establish must either be based on a
random process or there must exist a stable, stochastic relation between the
changed flow of profits in the evolving but unknown object systems and the properties
of the IMG systems which may be established. The latter position is taken in
this paper. The basis for our position arises from basic differences in the nature
and operation of IMG systems as contrasted with traditional market and production
systems
.
A production system transforms a flow of factor inputs into a flow of
products. Underlying the operation of a production process is an operating model
composed of a set of implicit and explicit submodels around which management,
workers, and machines function. Under the assumption of PHO knowledge the
model is so complete that it specifies in full the behavior of all components
of the production system. The model then, if known by the entrepreneur, can be
employed to perfectly predict the behavior of the real production system in the
absence of further innovation. At one level the submodels or decision rules may
be associated with the skills necessary/ to run a lathe. Other rules or models are
embodied in the lathe itself. At a different level the submodels are associated
with the interaction of the lathe and worker with the remainder of the productive
system or with the management submodels.
The inputs to the IMG process are also labor and equiment. The output,
however, is models of new products, new production processes, new methods of
marketing or finance etc. As with the production system, a collective operating
model must exist for directing the activities of persons and machines employed in
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the IMG system. How does this operating model compare with the operating model
of the ijroduction process?
T^e production model relates to a specific type of situation. The model can
be stereotyped as a large contingency program. It specifies, for instance, that
if conditions X have been met, combine engine number 24783 with transmission
number \k72\, then etc. Such a formulation is consistent with the traditional
concept of a "production set" composed of a finite number of activities in which
each activity is a collective vector of ways of doing things.
In contrast to the production model, the model inherent in the operation of
the IMG process functions under basically different conditions. Since the yet-to-
be-created innovation models vrtiich form the basis for later innovations cannot be
predicted by the entrepreneur at t , the models must arise from areas beyond the
entrepreneur's cognitive space at t^ (what he knows, and what he knows he can
derive from this at tg). It follows that the IMG system must involve a process
for searching for or discovering what is not known. In reality this search may be
for models which have already been created elsewhere, as well as for relations which
the entrepreneur must discover himself, and for models which he must create. In
the present case only the latter creati->'e source exists. Obviously this is an
essentially different process than the one employed in production. The operating
model, if we can call it that, underlying the IMG system must specify rules or
heuristics for the use of resources and time to acquire new relationships and
creatively combine these in such a way to yield a product and process model whidi
can be experimentally verified a^ "better" than existing models.
Let a heuristic set sufficient for guiding the generation of at least one
innovation model be denoted by m vdiere m is an element in a larger set K^ of"0
all such heuristic sets available at t . A given heuristic set m„ selected in t
o
determines the state ^, of the IMG system in period one. Given a state ^, , a
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rate of resources v, applied In accord with the heuristic, a period of time ^^
,
and a state of the arts and sciences in the object system ©|^, a new state of the
arts
^Yi*i is generated in h+1. Finally, a heuristic set m has a cost c. of
acquiring it.
Return now to the problem of making decisions with respect to these systems.
The investment decision can be thought of as one in which the entrepreneur must
decide which one of a set of different operating models of production processes
to use as a blue print for future operations. To decide which operating model
is "best", each must be imbedded in a broader model to be called the total situation,
or decision model, so that the implioations of using each of the operating models
as a basis for action can be evaluated. For example, a firm may generate a model
of a new product and process. To decide whether to produce the product the entre-
preneur must look at a broader model which reflects the market potential of the
product over time, at the availability of real financial capital, and at the
availability and stability of the necessary inputs of materials and labor. In
terms of (4) the product and process models are included in the alternative or
action set Aj^^. The broader decision model is the model of (4), (5), (6), and (?).
Since the IMGS adds to the set of operating models from which investment and
production decisions are made, an IKCIS must be evaluated through its effect on the
profit flow from the object system. Let the real operation of the IMGS and
object system be represented by:
(8) ©1=9,o
(9) C =C(Kj'0
(10) Fi4i^o)
(12) Vl=?(^h+l) /^ h=l,2....H
y^ >v .^\ I t=l,Z....r,
(13) Vt+irVs^t^ht) ^ ""
-^
-" /v
(14) TTv^.-nsy^,)
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where (8) is the initial state of the arts and sciences in the o'bject system,
(9) through (12) represent the IMG system and (13) and (l^) the object system.
A deterministic formulation is employed "because, as will become evident, a
stochastic formulation of the two systems contributes nothing to the analysis.
If (8) through (ik) could be modeled, decisions on which IMGS to establish
could be made on the basis of net present gain
—
gain in profits from innovating in
object system minus the cost of generating the innovation model all discounted
to the tiresent. Gain in profits /T.. is defined for a stage as the differenceht
between an innovating course of action // . . and the optimal profits ' l', obtained
had there been no IMG system set up (^v,t°^ht~^ht^'
In condensed form, gain In profits depends on decision variables M , R. , V. ,
n h
and A^^ given the generated Q^t
(15) fT^^=
^«o "^h-l \-l V/%) h=l,2....H t=l,2....r^
In this formulation, unchanging dimensions and structures in the object system
drop out of the model. Clearly, (15) might also have been formulated in terms
of per cent gain i^Yit^/^hO'
The entrepreneur's objective function formulated in terms of net present gain
( 16 ) G,=r z /r;/-11^ d'Ic,
In principle, an entrepreneur with the perfect foresight implied by (I5)
could identify the optimal m* (IMGS to establish) and could also identify optimal
values for v^, r*, a^^^, h=l....H, t=l....r . But as will be shown, such a
trajectory will be suboptimal for the entrepreneur with imperfect foresight
implied by the sanctity of creation postulate.
Given that the entrepreneur with imperfect foresight can postpone decisions
on vjj, r, , and a^^ until feedback, learning, and the IMGS reveals more of the
state distributions and new products and process models, he seeks then a model of
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(15) which can be employed with an objective function such as (l6) to identify
an optimal rn to acquire in t . To simplify, it will be assumed in the remainder
of this section that M is closed, that a heuristic set m^ can only be obtained
and an IMGS established in t , and that only a single innovation model is generated
in any period.
Although we ultimately seek to deal with an entrepreneur making a decision
for the first time on setting up an IMGS, a simpler case is considered first.
Assume that the entrepreneur has innovated numerous times in the past -T
stages and further has employed all possible IMG systems defined on M X V X R
in the past.
For each historical innovation model he can observe the heuristic set m
,
it's cost c , resources employed v, , time r , 0^, and ©^j^. Prom this the
gain in profits //^^ can be computed. In principle, this historical data
could be used to construct model (15) in the limiting case where the systems are
deterministic. But such a model would be of no value in predicting the future
because products and processes generated in the past can never repre£;ent innovations
in the future for the entrepreneur. Stated more formally, the set of 6^^
h" -T -1,0 cannot by definition include elements in the set &^, h=2....T.
It necessarily follow? if 0, and A.^, h=2....H, have no historical precedent
and cannot be predicted, they must be dropped from (I5) if the past is to provide
a relation between the set of possible IMG systems and gain in profits from
establishing these systems.
What are the implications of dropping 0, and A. . from (I5) and reestimating
the model from historical experience? In effect it says that a valid, useful
relation for prediction exists between the properties of the IKGS as reflected in
m
,
v
,
and r. and the f':ain in profits from the object system due to the existence
of the IMGS. This can be expressed ast
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^17) 7Tht(^^'^= ^^'%' Vl' Vl- *) h^H....© t-l....rj^
where ^ stands for expected gain in profits andil stands for hi^er moments of
the distribution. This stochastic formulation (l?) is consistent with a deter-
ministic formulation of IMGS and object systems represented in (8) through (14)
because ©. and a^i which make those systems deterministic do not appear in (17).
Stated differently, if the standard error of forecast of gain in profits
associated with (l?) when applied to independent data is significantly less than
the unconditional standard error, a necessary relation must exist between pro-
perties of the IMG systems and the gain in profits irrespective of what is the
state of the arts and sciences in an object system which, .by definition, changes
from the generation of one innovation model to the next. Each break throu^
in basic research is made from a new foundation laid by the previous breakthrough!
Under these conditions we must either draw the above conclusion or conclude
that the heuristic set m^ changes with each break through or innovation. The
latter conclusion implies a higher order heuristic-model-generating-system imposed
on the innovation-model-generating-system to generate new heuristic sets to cope
with the changing stage of the arts and sciences in the object system. While
some current research is devoted to generating more efficient heuristic sets [2312?]
,
it is generally not associated with changes in the state of the arts and sciences
in specific object systems, but rather is of a more general nature. But even if
such heuristic-model-generating-systems did exist to alter the IMG systems as the
state of the arts and sciences change, a similar prediction problem exists at this
level which requires a higher level system to resolve it. Clearly, this line of
reasoning leads to an infinite regress of generating systems piled on generating
systems. A condition which appears, from empirical studies, to have no foundation
in reality.
Given a model (1?) estimated from historical data, a criterion function of
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of (16) can oe empioyed by the entrepreneur to select an optimal m around which
an IKGS is established. Within operating IKGS, optimization then becomes one of
sequentially optimizing within the framework of the evolving innovation models
supplemented with feedback and learning—the intermediate and short run decision
problems which are not considered in this paper.
Ihls appears at first blush to be an extreme approach to optimization. Yet
it is one necessarily taken every day by individuals and firms. For example, in
making a decision on which assistant professor from a group of candidates to hire,
it is not possible to predict the specific contributions of each over the next
twenty years. Rather, an attempt is made to currently predict the value of each
one's unknown future creative addition to knowledge and progress which must take
place in the face of unknown changing structures and dimensions of that knowledge.
To do so we look at, or should look at, the research methods (heuristics) he uses
as reflected in his past work, his answers to questions about proposed future
attacks on problems, his method and methodological preparation, and at his access
to foundation support, his age and devotion to work (willingness to commit
resources). These factors are merely elements in (17).
A specialized part of the IKG system is the R&D process. Studies made of
these suggest that management of the firm have fairly clear ideas on the return
to investment or at least pay out period for R&D even though they do not know
the specific products and processes which will be forth coming uTj. This is
particularly true for the long range planning function which invariably includes
an R & D process in the plans. Clearly such decisions must be based on models of
the form of (17).
Variants on the approach of relating properties of the IMGS to gain in
value have appeared in disguised form in traditional economics. For example, the
traditional production functions relate quantities of labor and capital to
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quantities of a homogeneous output. At a conceptual limit, decomposition of the
real production process referred to by a traditional production function would
yield an unbroken chain of causal relations between the specific units of labor
and capital and the output. The introduction of progress generating inputs
into production functions implicitly relates an input (i.e. expenditures on
R & D) to gain in an output, without being able to trace through the specific
changes in the process which produces the increased output. Furthermore, the
qualitative dimensions of the output are invariably changing. The units of output
are now treated in the production function ais index units and are clearly no
longer real output. In effect they become a unit of value not unlike the profit
concept employed in this paper. If traditional labor and capital are treated as
constant, then the production function becomes:
(18) qt-^^Cvt)
i^ere v^ is the surrogate for the resources devoted to the IMGS. It may also,
where it is a constant, devote a rate of growth in output resulting from the
operation of an IMGS which alters the method of production.
The conceptual basis for the relation specified in (l?) is the heuristic
set around which the IMGS functions. Heuristics specify how to go about
searching a relatively unknown space for a desired outcome. Because creative
heuristics tend to be more complex and difficult to explicate, an example is
drawn from automata theory. By analogy, the automata can be thought of as a firm
which must discover a new product or process to survive.
An automaton (machine on wheels) which runs on batteries is turned loose in
a room full of N objects where it always has an equal chance of striking an object.
At one object the automaton can recharge it's batteries which, in the absence of
rechar,q;ing, can run M trials. One search heuristic may involve simply running
into objects until it strikes the one which can recharge it's batteries.
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The probability th?it it will recharge and thus survive in the K trials is
i—\'aj)7J' ^ second search heuristic involves recording the space through which
it moves so that it does not strike an object twice. Its probability of survival
Is 2L A' which is greater than that when operating under the first heuristic.
As long as the marginal expected return of survival for the second heuristic is
greater than its marginal cost over the first, the second heuristic will on the
average make the automaton better off irrespective of where it stairts out from in
the space or even if the space is rearranged.
In a similar manner, as discussed earlier, an entrepreneur searches the space
of possible unknown artificial systems © for innovation models which will on
net make him "better off" by some amount. The history of man's progress indicates
that there are many innovation models which will do so in this space.
It is interesting to speculate on some likely properties of optimal
heuristic sets. Let generality of a heuristic set be defined in terms of the
amount of structures which must be imposed on a space to be searched in order to
yield a gLven probability of identifying a specified percent gain in profit given
a level of resources Vj^ and tine r, . A specific heuristic tailored to a specific
structure to be searched will yield a higher probability than a general one applied
to the same structure. 3ut the general one will yield a sequence of hi^er
probabilities when applied to one with little structure or changing structures.
Althou^ costs are discussed later when the social generation of models is
discussed, for the present it is assumed that each heuristic set has the same
cost.
Several conjectures can be made. First, since each innovation must be
generated from a new knowledge base, the generality of the optimal heuristic
set m will increase with the number of innovations H which the entrepreneur
plans to make over T. Second, the generality depends on the degree of foresi^t
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which the entrepreneur has. The entrepreneur with perfect foresight selects an
ra_ to generate models in K different specific structures. An entrepreneur with
"limited foresight" can know a settl7v,., which may be generated but does not know
which ©!,.,€.©, , will actually be generated. Rather he perfectly predicts a
'!+-' h+1
distribution defined onC7, ... Assume a uniform distribution and K structuresh+l
inCy. . , At t he knows the existing product and markets 6q=Q.i which form the
base for his first innovation. Hp can then predict that one structure from the
set Opi* ®22 ®2k~^-^ will be generated by the IMG system in h=2, t=l. As
a result, he roust select a heuristic set so that he will be preisared to generate
an innovation during h=2 for each of the K structures which may obtain, li he
Th-l)
plans to innovate K times over T, he must then be prepared to innovate in K
different object systems in any stage and in 2— K different structures over his
h
-I
existence horizon. Reduction in foresight (to a stochastic model) then forces
an increase in the generality of the heuristic set selected.
If now the entrepreneur knows nothing of the products and processes which
may be innovated into the system in the long run, then by extension of the
above logic he must be prepared to innovate in a very large number of structures.
In the absense of contrary evidence, it seems reasonable to conclude that a high
level of generality will be required for the optimal m .
This statement must be qualified when specialization in the innovation
generating process is possible. If university research, government research, and
research by other entrepreneurs exists, then the ideas, concepts, and models
created by and made public by these institutions form a model base from which
the entrepreneur can proceed to generate an innovation. As a result, the space
to be searched to bring a new product and process to the innovation model stage
will be smaller and better structured than that which exists without such speciali-
zation. As a result, the entrepreneur can employ a more specific set of heuristics.
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In this case the heuristic set must also relate to searching uiniversity,
government, and other relevant sources for potential product and process
models created there as well as creatively developing these models into
innovation models which work within the entreijreneur's specific situation,
V. SCGIETAL FUNGTIOIn-S
Let the aissunption that the entrepreneur has innovated many times in the
past be dropped and replaced with the assumption that the entrepreneur has not
innovated before, Kodel (l7) must be constructed from historical data of inno-
vations by other entrepreneurs. Models of (1?) based on such data seem more
plausible given the likely general nature of heuristics and some structural level
at which the entrepreneur plans to innovate.
Obviously, the cost of constructing model (l?) is likely to be large,
particularly when the assumption of PHK is dropped. But given the likely general
nature of models of the form of (l?) they can be used with modifications for
decisions on which ra^ to select by many entrepreneurs operating in different
object systems. But given the indivisibility and inappropriability of such
models when viewed as market products it would, as Arrow lIJ points out, be
socially optimal for society to take over or ragulate the construction of such
models. For similar rear. ins, it would be socially optimal for society to assume
responsibility for generating new more efficient heuristics (create new elements
in M), Finally, heuristic sets and models of the form of (l?) should be made
available to all entrepreneurs at a near zero cost since the marginal cost of
reproducing them is low.
The cost of learning heuristic sets may not be small. However, it is felt
that teachers intuitively know that the tine and cost required to learn additional
units of knowledge tends to fall off. Thus the cost of acquiring more general n^
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Is likely increasing but at. a decreasing rate. If, then, the return to more
general sets is Increasing at a constant or increasing rate, the entrepreneur will
acquire the most general heuristic sets available, ceteres paribus.
VI. IMPLKMENTAT ION
An obvious direction for implementation is to orp3.nize what is known of
heuristic sets and of models of the form of (17). Our understanding of these
is in its infancy. The problem is compounded by the fact that in empirical work
it is not possible to assume away the discovery and learning processes which
produce necessary inputs to the IKG processes.
When the assumption of perfect knowledge and learning processes is dropped,
then the entrepreneur must decide on what kind of learning system to establish.
Where learning is defined to include creative discovery, then the entrepreneur is
again faced with inability to predict future possible states and alternatives.
Furthermore, since learning may also occur through communication, it is equally
clear that the entrepreneur cannot predict what he will learn in this manner in
the future, v'here such learning is necessary to achieve an optimal trajectory,
as seems likely in a technically changing world, the received view of optimization
will identify suboptimal conditions. The necessary approach parallels that for
optimizlni?: with respect to pure Innovating.
Kuch exploratory work in these two areas has been done. As mentioned, Newell,
Shaw, and Simon have done the pioneering work in heuristics for creative problem
solving. Kore recent work has extended their initial concepts. There have been
a number of studies and programs relating to the necessary environment and methods
employed in research and development laboratories [j.0,27j. More general studies
of the processes leading to successful innovation abound y.2,17,10,22j . Studies
of invention and related processes yield evidence on methods used by successful
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inventors I See bibliograj±iy in ITJ . Much of the work in "systems theory"
similarly relates to methods for learning about and optimizing existing systems.
Studies of creativity and attempts to teach creativity are another source of
heuristics j_3,2^,33j' -f one argiios for ^n inherent creative ability, then
attempts to measure such ability become relevant for organizations who may acquire
creativity by acquiring creative individuals jsee "creativity" in 261 . Unfor-
tunately thex-e has been little attempt to empirically relate heuristic sets to
gain expected from them in different situations.
It may be felt by the reader that in evolving a theoretical structure without
specifying the heuristic sets and models of (17), the problem has been attacked
from the wrong direction. Actually, the reverse approach was employed initially,
A few years ago the writer selected for a case study eight pairs of firms which
produced similar tiroducts and had similar external environments, as reflected in
size, access to markets, location, etc. Cf some 1100 firms considered, only these
eight pairs met the criteria. One firm in each of the eight pairs had expanded
internally "by 200 percent over the previous five years while the other had de-
clined. Information, through extensive interviews vrith management from the
president to supervisory levels, was obtained about the current structure and
operation of the forecast, resea-^cli, motivation, inforiiation, production, and
finance subsystems of each firm as well as changes in these over the previous five
years . One immediate observation was that the firms internally were as different
as day is from night. 3mploying the VJeltansicht of the received view, the specific
observable conditions and situations and changes in them for the firms in each
pair were compared. The result was complexity and dead ends which aborted
attempts to generalize the findings. Interpreted in terrr.s of the notation employed
in this paper, we focused on ©^ and a.^^ in comparing the firms. But these are
not relevant in modeling the innovative and learning processes. The data is
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currently being reanalyzed in terms of patterns in the learning and innovating
heuristics (to the extent they were obtained) of the expanding and declining
firms. Preliminary results indicate very different heuristics and resource
levels were employed by firms in each pair.
Other important directions for implementation involve the introduction of
competition and the analysis of the innovation intermediate run. The introduction
of competition now means that the effectiveness of an lilGS depends on the IMGS
employed by competitors. Model (l?) must then contain variables representing
the expected properties of competitors IMG systems. It is felt that as a first
approximation the latter problem of analyzing the intermegliate run will yield to
some form of functional analysis of the larger evolving model which allows an upper
limit to be placed on the value of creating a submodel to perform that function.
A model of (20) then might specify the proportion of this potential gain which may
be achieved by various IMGS. Unfortunately, this apr^roach breaks down or must
become an iterative process in the face of the possibility of creatively redesigning
the larger -system.
VII. GOKaUSIONS
Beginning with the assumption that innovating is necessary for an entrepreneur
to optimize in the long run it has been shown that the received view of optimization
cannot identify an optimal trajectory for an entrepreneur planning to establish
a firm. Nor is it likely to identify a.r^ optimal allocation of resources to an
ongoing process or system for generating learning and innovation.
The implications for welfare theory, evolving as they have within the received
view approach, are extensive. First, welfare theory appears to be moving toward
dynamic models based on optimal control theory. It has been shown that even at
the ideal limit where an entrepreneur has perfect historical knowledge, the
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approach will necessarily lead to suboptimal lonjc run trajectories. Thus a
different approach must be employed which is not based on the concept of the
stochastic causal chain inherent to the received viev;.
Second, use of the approach prox)Osed in this paper allows optimization throu^
learning and innovation to be introduced into the models of firms from which
long run welfare conclusions are derived. As a minimum, the result will force
a recognition of the role of learning and inno'/ating in welfare analysis.
Third, given that the heuristics and methods underlying the operation of
II'iG systems are general to large classes of real systems, then optimization of
social welfare requires that such knowledge be generated as a public good and
made available at near zero cost. In view of indivisibility, inappropriability,
and uncertainty associated with this knowledge when viewed as a market good,
private development would not proceed to an optimal level.
When our focus shifts from the entrepreneur to a behavioral unit, the analysis
suggests that the behavioral unit should acquire the learning and innovating
heuristics as early as possible in its existence horizon. Clearly this should
be an objective of our educational system. But an additional problem appears,
and that is making the decision as to the heuristics to be taught to different
students so that we ultimately have a balanced supply for different levels of
specialization.
Finally, it follows that empirical research on the innovation process should
deal less with description of the conditions in the object system before and
after innovation. Instead, the focus should be on the methods and heuristics
used to generate the innovation and relating these to the gain in "profits".
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